Monday, September 9, 2013

Reading Materials for Research Writing - Indonesia's Government Goals and Plans



HISTORY
By the time of the Renaissance, the islands of Java and Sumatra had already enjoyed a 1,000-year heritage of advanced civilization spanning two major empires. During the 7th-14th centuries, the Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya flourished on Sumatra. At its peak, the Srivijaya Empire reached as far as West Java and the Malay Peninsula. Also by the 14th century, the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit had risen in eastern Java. Gadjah Mada, the empire's chief minister from 1331 to 1364, succeeded in gaining allegiance from most of what is now modern Indonesia and much of the Malay archipelago as well. Legacies from Gadjah Mada's time include a codification of law and an epic poem. Islam arrived in Indonesia sometime during the 12th century and supplanted Hinduism by the end of the 16th century in Java and Sumatra. Bali, however, remains overwhelmingly Hindu. In the eastern archipelago, both Christian and Islamic proselytizing took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, and, currently, there are large communities of both religions on these islands.

Beginning in 1602, the Dutch slowly established themselves as rulers of Indonesia, exploiting the weakness of the small kingdoms that had replaced that of Majapahit. The only exception was East Timor, which remained under Portugal's control until 1975. During 300 years of rule, the Dutch developed the Netherlands East Indies into one of the world's richest colonial possessions, extracting natural resources through co-opted local elites but doing little to modernize Indonesia.

During the first decade of the 20th century, an Indonesian independence movement began and expanded rapidly, particularly between the two World Wars. Its leaders came from a small group of young professionals and students, some of whom had been educated in the Netherlands. Many, including Indonesia's first president, Soekarno (1945-67), were imprisoned for political activities.

During World War II, Japan invaded Indonesia (in early 1942), outclassing a combined American, British, Dutch, and Australian military command. Sizeable U.S. naval forces and smaller air and ground forces sent to defend Indonesia were defeated, with heavy losses in ships and large numbers of Americans killed or captured. The Japanese treated captured Allied troops and interned Western civilians with extreme cruelty. Because of local animosity toward Dutch colonial rule, there was no anti-Japanese guerilla movement as in the Philippines and Malaysia, and most Indonesians initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators. But increasingly harsh Japanese rule strengthened the prewar independence movement, and on August 17, 1945, 3 days after Japan’s surrender to the Allies, a small group of Indonesians, led by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, proclaimed independence and established the Republic of Indonesia. They set up a provisional government and adopted a constitution to govern the republic until elections could be held and a new constitution written. Fighting soon broke out between Indonesian independence groups and Allied forces--mainly British, Indian, and Australian forces--sent to accept the Japanese surrender. Dutch efforts later to reestablish complete control met resistance. Following the Philippines' independence in 1946, the U.S. was unwilling to see the Netherlands use post-war Marshall Plan support to indirectly fund the suppression of Indonesia’s independence. Negotiations and on-and-off fighting in Indonesia continued until 1949. The stalemate, combined with reduced international support and a devastated economy in the Netherlands, led to the Dutch decision to withdraw from Indonesia. Colonial rule and its violent end left a legacy in Indonesia of mistrusting foreign motives, especially those of large powers. In 1950, Indonesia became the 60th member of the United Nations.

Shortly after hostilities with the Dutch ended in 1949, Indonesia adopted a new constitution, providing for a parliamentary system of government in which the executive was chosen by and accountable to parliament. Parliament was divided among many political parties before and after the country's first nationwide election in 1955, and stable governmental coalitions were difficult to achieve. The role of Islam in Indonesia was debated. Soekarno defended a secular state based on Pancasila, five principles of the state philosophy--monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, representative democracy by consensus, and social justice--codified in the 1945 constitution, while some Muslim groups preferred either an Islamic state or a constitution that included a preambular provision requiring adherents of Islam to be subject to Islamic law. At the time of independence, the Dutch retained control over the western half of New Guinea (known as Irian Jaya in the Soekarno and Suharto eras and as Papua since 2000) and permitted steps toward self-government and independence.

Negotiations with the Dutch on the incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesia failed, and armed clashes broke out between Indonesian and Dutch troops in 1961. In August 1962, the two sides reached an agreement, and Indonesia assumed administrative responsibility for Irian Jaya on May 1, 1963. The Indonesian Government conducted an "Act of Free Choice" in Irian Jaya under UN supervision in 1969 in which 1,025 Papuan representatives of local councils agreed by consensus to remain a part of Indonesia. A subsequent UN General Assembly resolution confirmed the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Opposition to Indonesian administration of Papua gave rise to small-scale guerrilla activity in the years following Jakarta's assumption of control. In the more open atmosphere since 1998, there have been more explicit expressions within Papua calling for independence from Indonesia.

Unsuccessful rebellions on Sumatra, Sulawesi, West Java, and other islands beginning in 1958, plus a failure by the constituent assembly to develop a new constitution, weakened the parliamentary system. Consequently, in 1959, when President Soekarno unilaterally revived the provisional 1945 constitution that provided for broad presidential powers, he met little resistance. From 1959 to 1965, President Soekarno imposed an authoritarian regime under the label of "Guided Democracy."

Soekarno favored a foreign policy of nonalignment, a stance supported by other prominent leaders of former colonies who rejected formal alliances with either the West or Soviet bloc. Under Soekarno's auspices, these leaders gathered in Bandung, West Java, in 1955 to lay the groundwork for what became known as the Non-Aligned Movement. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, President Soekarno moved closer to Asian communist states and toward the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in domestic affairs. The PKI represented the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union and China.

By 1965, the PKI controlled many of the mass civic and cultural organizations that Soekarno had established to mobilize support for his regime and, with Soekarno's acquiescence, embarked on a campaign to establish a "Fifth Column" by arming its supporters. Army leaders resisted this campaign. Under circumstances that have never been fully explained, on October 1, 1965, PKI sympathizers within the military, including elements from Soekarno's palace guard, occupied key locations in Jakarta and kidnapped and murdered six senior generals. Major General Suharto, the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, rallied army troops opposed to the PKI to reestablish control over the city. Violence swept throughout Indonesia in the aftermath of the October 1 events, and unsettled conditions persisted through 1966. Right-wing groups killed tens of thousands of alleged communists in rural areas. Estimates of the number of deaths range between 160,000 and 500,000. The violence was especially brutal in Java and Bali. During this period, PKI members by the tens of thousands turned in their membership cards. The emotions and fears of instability created by this crisis persisted for many years as the communist party remains banned from Indonesia.

Throughout the 1965-66 period, President Soekarno vainly attempted to restore his political stature and shift the country back to its pre-October 1965 position. Although he remained President, in March 1966, Soekarno transferred key political and military powers to General Suharto, who by that time had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) named General Suharto acting President. Soekarno ceased to be a political force and lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970.

President Suharto proclaimed a "New Order" in Indonesian politics and dramatically shifted foreign and domestic policies away from the course set in Soekarno's final years. The New Order established economic rehabilitation and development as its primary goals and pursued its policies through an administrative structure dominated by the military but with advice from Western-educated economic experts. In 1968, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) formally selected Suharto to a full 5-year term as President, and he was reelected to successive 5-year terms in 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998. In mid-1997, Indonesia suffered from the Asian financial and economic crisis, accompanied by the worst drought in 50 years and falling prices for commodity exports. As the exchange rate changed from a fixed to a managed float to fully floating, the rupiah (IDR or Rp) depreciated in value, inflation increased significantly, and capital flight accelerated. Demonstrators, initially led by students, called for Suharto's resignation. Amid widespread civil unrest, Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, 3 months after the MPR had selected him for a seventh term. Suharto's hand-picked Vice President, B.J. Habibie, became Indonesia's third President. President Habibie reestablished International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor community support for an economic stabilization program. He released several prominent political and labor prisoners, initiated investigations into the unrest, and lifted controls on the press, political parties, and labor unions.

In January 1999, Habibie and the Indonesian Government agreed to a process, with UN involvement, under which the people of East Timor would be allowed to choose between autonomy and independence through a direct ballot held on August 30, 1999. Some 98% of registered voters cast their ballots, and 78.5% of the voters chose independence over continued integration with Indonesia. Many people were killed by Indonesian military forces and military-backed militias in a wave of violence and destruction after the announcement of the pro-independence vote.

Indonesia's first elections in the post-Suharto period were held for the national, provincial, and sub-provincial parliaments on June 7, 1999. Forty-eight political parties participated in the elections. For the national parliament, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri) won 34% of the vote; Golkar ("Functional Groups" party) 22%; Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party, linked to the moderate Islamic organization Nadhlatul Ulama headed by former President Abdurrahman Wahid) 13%; and the conservative Islamic Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party, led by Hamzah Haz) 11%. The MPR selected Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's fourth President in November 1999 and replaced him with Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001.

The constitution, as amended in the post-Suharto era, now provides for the direct election by popular vote of the president and vice president. Under the 2004 amendment, only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 3% of the House of Representatives (DPR) seats or 5% of the vote in national legislative elections were eligible to nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket.

The 2004 legislative elections took place on April 5 and were considered to be generally free and fair. Twenty-four parties took part in the elections. Big parties lost ground, while small parties gained larger shares of the vote. However, the two Suharto-era nationalist parties, PDI-P and Golkar, remained in the lead. PDI-P (opposition party during the Suharto era) lost its plurality in the House of Representatives, dropping from 33% to 18.5% of the total vote (and from 33% to 20% of the seats). The Golkar Party (Suharto’s political party) declined slightly from 1999 levels, going from 22% to 21% of the national vote (from 26% to 23% of DPR seats). The third- and fourth-largest parties (by vote share) were two Islamic-oriented parties, the United Development Party (PPP) (8% of the votes, 10.5% of the seats) and National Awakening Party (PKB) (10.5% of the vote, 9.45% of the seats). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s nationalist Democratic Party (PD) won 7.45% of the national vote and 10% of the DPR seats, making it the fourth-largest party in the DPR. Seven of the 24 parties won no DPR seats; six won 1-2 seats, and the other six won between 2%-6% of the national vote (between 5-52 DPR seats).

The first direct presidential election was held on July 5, 2004, contested by five tickets. As no candidate won at least 50% of the vote, a runoff election was held on September 20, 2004, between the top two candidates, President Megawati Sukarnoputri and retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In this final round, Yudhoyono won 60.6% of the vote. Approximately 76.6% of the eligible voters participated, a total of roughly 117 million people, making Indonesia's presidential election the largest single-day election in the world. The Carter Center, which sent a delegation of election observers, issued a statement congratulating "the people and leaders of Indonesia for the successful conduct of the presidential election and the peaceful atmosphere that has prevailed throughout the ongoing democratic transition."

In 2009, national legislative elections were held on April 9 and presidential elections were held in July. They were peaceful and considered free and fair. New electoral rules required that a party win 2.5% of the national vote in order to enter parliament. A total of thirty-eight national and six local (Aceh only) parties contested the 2009 legislative elections. At least 171 million voters registered to vote in these elections. Voter turnout was estimated to be 71% of the electorate. Nine parties won parliamentary seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). The top three winners were secular nationalist parties: President Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat, with 20.85% of the vote; Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s Golkar Party, 14.45%; and former president Megawati’s opposition PDI-P party, with 14.03%. The next four largest parties were all Islamic-oriented parties: PKS, PAN (6%), PPP (5.3%), and PKB (4.9%). Only PKS maintained its 2004 vote share (7.88%); the other three declined in popularity. The smallest two parties in Parliament, Gerindra and Hanura, with 4.46 and 3.77% of the vote respectively, were headed by retired Suharto-era army generals Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto (one name only). The 2009 DPR members took their seats October 1.

Also in 2009, the threshold was revised so that only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 20% of the House of Representatives (DPR) seats or 25% of the vote in the 2009 national legislative elections would be eligible to nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket. Partai Demokrat, Golkar, and PDI-P parties, the top winners in the legislative elections, nominated presidential candidates. To win in one round, a presidential candidate was required to receive more than 50% of the vote and more than 20% of the vote in 17 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces. If no candidate did so, the top two candidates would have competed in a second round in September 2009.

Three tickets competed in the presidential elections. Incumbent President Yudhoyono and his running mate, non-partisan former Central Bank Chair and Economics Minister Boediono, won the election with such a significant plurality--60.6%--that it obviated the need for a second round of elections. Main challenger and former president and opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri and running mate Prabowo Subianto trailed with 28%. Meanwhile, Vice President Jusuf Kalla and running mate Wiranto came in last at 12.7%. Indonesia’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) inaugurated President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for his second term as president on October 20, 2009.

Natural disasters have devastated many parts of Indonesia over the past few years. On December 26, 2004, a 9.1 to 9.3 magnitude earthquake took place in the Indian Ocean, and the resulting tsunami killed over 130,000 people in Aceh and left more than 500,000 homeless. On March 26, 2005, an 8.7 magnitude earthquake struck between Aceh and northern Sumatra, killing 905 people and displacing tens of thousands. After much media attention on the seismic activity on Mt. Merapi in April and May 2006, a 6.2 magnitude earthquake occurred 30 miles to the southwest. It killed more than 5,000 people and left an estimated 200,000 people homeless in the Yogyakarta region. An earthquake of 7.4 struck Tasikmalaya, West Java, on September 2, 2009, killing approximately 100 people. On September 30, 2009, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Western Sumatra. No official statistics were released on deaths and injuries; however, press reports indicated more than 1,100 fatalities.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Indonesia is a republic based on the 1945 constitution providing for a separation of executive, legislative, and judicial power. Substantial restructuring has occurred since President Suharto's resignation in 1998 and the short, transitional Habibie administration in 1998 and 1999. The Habibie government established political reform legislation that formally set up new rules for the electoral system, the House of Representatives (DPR), the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), and political parties without changing the 1945 Indonesian constitution. After these reforms, the constitution now limits the president to two terms in office.

Indonesia adopted a bicameral legislative system following the establishment of the DPD (Regional Representatives Council), which was first elected in 2004. The DPD is composed of four representatives from each of Indonesia’s 33 provinces. Although it can make proposals and submit opinions on legislative matters concerning the regions, it does not have the power to create legislation. The MPR consists of both the DPD and the DPR. The MPR has the power to inaugurate and to impeach the president (upon the recommendation of the DPR). The current Speaker of the MPR is Taufik Kiemas (from the opposition PDI-P Party) and the Speaker of the DPR is Marzuki Alie (from the ruling Democrat Party). These speakers and four deputy speakers for the DPR and MPR took up their positions on October 5, 2009. The largest party in the DPR, now President Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat, filled the influential DPR speaker position.

The president, elected for a 5-year term, is the top government and political figure. The president and the vice president were elected by popular vote for the first time on September 20, 2004. Previously, the MPR selected Indonesia's president. In 1999, the MPR selected Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur, as the fourth President. The MPR removed Gus Dur in July 2001, immediately appointing then-Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri as the fifth President. In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was directly elected to succeed Megawati. He was re-elected in 2009.

The president, assisted by an appointed cabinet, has the authority to conduct the administration of the government.

President Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat (PD) holds 148 of the 560 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), making it the largest political party represented in the legislature. Partai Demokrat has a coalition with Golkar and four Islam-oriented parties. The coalition holds a majority of the seats in the DPR. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has 692 members, including 560 members of the DPR and the 132 representatives of the Council of Regional Representatives (DPD). Up to and through 2004, citizens elected legislators for the DPR and DPD, but their vote was based on a party list system. This ensured that the party elite, placed at the top of the party candidate lists, were voted into office. In 2009, a multi-member district “majority vote wins” system allowed voters for the first time to directly put a candidate who won a plurality of votes into office.

Prior to 2004, some legislative seats had been reserved for representatives of the armed forces. The military has been a significant political force throughout Indonesian history, though it had ceded its formal political role by 2004. The armed forces shaped the political environment and provided leadership for Suharto's New Order from the time it came to power in the wake of the abortive 1965 uprising. Military officers, especially from the army, were key advisers to Suharto and Habibie and had considerable influence on policy. Under the dual function concept ("dwifungsi"), the military asserted a role in socio-political affairs. This concept was used to justify placement of officers in the civilian bureaucracy at all government levels and in regional and national legislatures. Although the military retains influence, the wide-ranging democratic reforms instituted since 1999 abolished "dwifungsi" and ended the armed forces' formal involvement in government administration. The police were separated from the military in 1999, further reducing the military's direct role in governmental matters. Control of the military by the democratically elected government has been strengthened.

Reflecting historically independent sentiment, Hasan di Tiro established the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) in December 1976 to seek independence for Aceh. Some 15,000 died in military conflict in Aceh over the following 3 decades. Through peace talks led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, a peace agreement between GAM and the Indonesian Government that provided wide-ranging autonomy for Aceh was signed on August 15, 2005. By December 2005, GAM declared that it had disbanded the military wing of its organization, and the Indonesian Government had withdrawn the bulk of its security forces down to agreed levels. On December 11, 2006, Aceh held gubernatorial and district administrative elections, the first truly democratic elections in over half a century in Aceh, resulting in the election of a former separatist leader as governor. In 2009, Aceh participated in the national legislative and presidential elections and elected its own provincial legislature.



Soekarno's Old Order: the Birth of Indonesia
Soekarno (1901-1970), born in the East Javanese city of Surabaya during the colonial rule of the Dutch, was a leading nationalist who devoted his life to the struggle for independence of Indonesia. Although growing up in a traditional Javanese cultural environment (in combination with Balinese influences from his mother's side of the family), Soekarno was educated in the modern Dutch colonial schools. From a young age his major interest lay in reading books on the topic of philosophy, politics and socialism. When studying in Surabaya, Soekarno lived in the house of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, the first leader of the Sarekat Islam (which would become an important movement for the nationalist awakening of Indonesia). Tjokroaminoto became Soekarno's political mentor and inspiration.  
In 1927 Soekarno established and became leader of a political vehicle called the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, abbreviated PNI) which aimed for full independence of Indonesia. However, these subversive political activities resulted in his arrest and imprisonment by the repressive Dutch colonial regime in 1929. For Indonesians at that time Soekarno's imprisonment only strengthened his image as a national hero and freedom fighter. After his release Soekarno was in continuous conflict with the colonial authorities during the 1930s, resulting in multiple imprisonments. When the Japanese invaded the Dutch Indies in March 1942, Soekarno considered collaboration with the Japanese as the only means to reach independence successfully. A tactic which proved to be effective.
Today, the people of Indonesia highly respect and admire Soekarno, exponent of Indonesian nationalism, for devoting his life to Indonesian independence and for bringing a new political identity to the country.

The Difficult Birth of the Indonesian Nation
When Soekarno (Indonesia's first president) and Mohammed Hatta (first vice-president), two of the country's most prominent nationalists, pronounced the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, together with the publication of a short and provisional constitution, troubles were far from over. In fact, it would take four more years of Revolution against the Dutch who - after being freed from the Germans in Europe - returned to reclaim their colony. The Dutch were stubborn to relinquish their lucrative Southeast Asian colony but eventually had to face reality. Under international pressure they acknowledged Indonesian independence in 1949 (except for the western half of the island of New Guinea). However, negotiations with the Dutch resulted in the 'Republic of the United States of Indonesia' containing a Federal Constitution that was considered to be too much influenced by the Dutch. Therefore, it was quickly replaced by a new constitution in 1950 which stipulated a parliamentary system of government, provided guarantees for individual freedoms and made the military subordinate to the nation's civilian leadership. The president mainly had a ceremonial role only in this system.
Debates between several influential sides regarding the ideological basis of Indonesia and the organization of relations between organs of the state had begun even before the proclamation in 1945. The army, heroes of the Revolution, had always harboured political aspirations of their own. The 1950 Constitution, however, provided no political role for the army. Muslim representatives at the constitutional talks -although on other subjects not representing a homogeneous group- wanted Indonesia to become an Islamic state ruled by shariah law. But other sides felt that the establishment of an Islamic state would endanger the unity of Indonesia and might trigger revolts or calls for separatism as the country contains millions of non-Muslims. Much to the dismay of both Muslim groups and the army, the communist party PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) made an impressive comeback. Being outlawed by the colonial authorities in 1927 for the organizing of revolts in West Java and West Sumatra, it gained much support in Central and East Java, becoming one of the most popular parties on a national scale. And lastly, there were the nationalists who stressed the need for individual rights against the state. Their party was the PNI (the political party version of the previously mentioned PNI movement, set up by Soekarno in 1927 that targeted for independence). This PNI party gained much popularity in the country.
Pancasila Indonesia InvestmentsSoekarno had to find a way to unite these diverse viewpoints. In June 1945 he revealed his view on Indonesian nationhood by proclaiming his Pancasila philosophy. Pancasila are the five principles that would become the foundation of the Indonesian state:

1. Belief in one supreme God

2. Justice and civility among peoples
3. Unity of Indonesia
4. Democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives
5. Social justice for all the people of Indonesia


One lasting problem with uniting a highly pluralistic Indonesian society through the Pancasila, however, was the demand for an Islamic state by the Muslim parties. Initially a constitutional committee agreed to add a short addition to the first principle: 'Belief in one supreme God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to implement the Islamic shariah law.' However, just before publishing the 1945 Constitution this addition (known as the Jakarta Charter) was dropped due to fears that it might provoke resentment in nominal and non-Muslim circles. Its omission would cause deep distrust towards the secular nationalists in stricter parts of the Islamic community.

Parliamentary Democracy
Indonesia's parliamentary democracy of the 1950s was characterized by instability. The underlying reason being the differences in viewpoints on the ideological basis of the country. This situation was to be reflected in Indonesia's first general elections. These elections took place in 1955 and are considered to be free and fair (and it would take more than 40 years before Indonesia witnessed another example of fair and free elections). The two big Muslim parties Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (of which the latter had split off from the Masyumi in 1952) received 20.9 and 18.4 percent respectively. The nationalist PNI received 20.3 percent of the votes, while the communist PKI obtained 16.4 percent. This meant there was no workable majority for any party but instead governments had to be created by forming coalitions between various ideological streams. From 1950 to 1959 seven cabinets would take turns in rapid succession, each failing to make significant progress for the country.
Besides disagreement within the political elite in Jakarta, there were other problems that endangered the unity of Indonesia in the 1950s. The militant Darul Islam movement, which aimed to establish an Islamic state and used guerrilla-techniques to reach its goal, was winning territory in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. This movement had already started during the colonial period but quickly redirected its focus towards the Soekarno government until it surrendered in 1962. Other subversive movements that made impact were the Universal Struggle Charter (Permesta) in North Sulawesi and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in West Sumatra. Both started in the late 1950s and confronted the central government with demands for political, economic and regional reform. These movements were led by regional military officers, supported by members of the Masyumi and the American Intelligence Agency (CIA) which regarded the popularity of the communist PKI party as a major threat. By using military force the central government managed to silence these movements in the early 1960s. Lastly, former members of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL) proclaimed the Republic of the South Moluccas in 1950. Although being largely defeated by Indonesian forces in the same year, armed struggles continued until 1963.

Soekarno's Guided Democracy
Soekarno was aware that the period of liberal democracy was hampering Indonesia's development due to the ideological differences within the cabinets. The solution Soekarno proposed was named "Guided Democracy", meaning a return to the 1945 Constitution which foresaw a strong presidency with authoritarian tendencies. This way he had more power to realize his ideals. The army, which was unhappy with its insignificant influence in political matters up to that point, supported this reorientation. By 1958 Soekarno had already recognized the army as a 'functional group' meaning that they became agents in the political process but with the period of Guided Democracy its role in politics was about to increase.
In 1959 Soekarno ushered in the period of Guided Democracy. He disbanded parliament and replaced it with a new one in which half of the members were appointed by himself. Soekarno was also aware of the danger for his position if the army would become too strong. Therefore, he relied on the support of the communist PKI to counter-balance the army's power. Both the army and the PKI were members of his 'Nasakom' philosophy, an acronym referring to the union between the three most important ideological strands in Indonesian society in the 1950s and early 1960s to wit nationalism (nasionalisme), religion (agama), and communism (komunisme). These three components had little in common, in fact they harboured deep resentment towards each other. It was up to Soekarno's political skills, charisma and status to keep these components together.
Another feature of Soekarno's Guided Democracy was the anti-Western tone of his policies. He intensified efforts to take control over the western part of New Guinea. After some armed conflicts the Dutch gave the territory to the United Nations that subsequently gave it to Indonesia the following year. From 1962 to 1966 Soekarno masterminded the confrontation policy against Malaysia. He considered the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, including Malaya, Singapore, and former British Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah), as a continuation of colonial rule and launched an unsuccessful military campaign to crush Malaysia. Part of this confrontation policy was the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations (UN) due to the UN's approval of Malaysia as a member state. In 1965 Soekarno continued cutting links with the capitalist Western world by withdrawing Indonesia from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Word Bank, meaning that much needed foreign aid would cease to flow to Indonesia. This worsened Indonesia's economic situation which had already reached extreme precarious levels by then.

The Mysterious Coup by the 30 September Movement
Tensions between the three components of Nasakom heightened. On 30 September 1965 it became clear just how dangerous the political cocktail was that Soekarno had created. On that evening six army generals and one lieutenant were kidnapped and killed by a group of leftist officers who called themselves the 30 September Movement. Allegedly, these murdered officers were planning a coup to topple Soekarno. However, there is no evidence that there would be a military coup against Soekarno. There is also no evidence that the communist PKI party was behind the pre-emptive strike to prevent the military coup. Yet, Suharto, head of the Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) who seized control over the army being the highest army commander after the killings of his superiors, immediately put the blame on the PKI. Soon communists and suspected communists were slaughtered, especially in the provinces of Central Java, East Java, Bali and North Sumatra. Estimates of victims vary between 400,000 and one million people. It is suspected that the killers of these communists were army units, civilian gangs (who received weaponry from army units) and the militant Ansor youth wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama. These Indonesian killings continued through 1965 and 1966. However, many issues surrounding the coup and subsequent anti-communist purges remain unclear until the present day and will probably never be known. After Suharto's New Order ended in 1998, Indonesians started to doubt the official explanation of the government which put the blame on the communists but this chapter in its history has not received profound attention in the public discourse of the country yet, except for a report made by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 2012 that labeled the communist purges as a gross human rights violation.
The coup and its aftermath also entailed dramatic political consequences for Soekarno. Indonesia was in a state of martial law which had put effective authority in the hands of General Suharto. During the next two years Suharto would slowly but decisively extend his powers and put Soekarno on the sideline. This marked the beginning of Suharto's New Order. Soekarno was put under house arrest in Bogor (West Java) where his health deteriorated until his death in 1970. 



Suharto's New Order: Development of Indonesia under Authoritarian Rule

Suharto (1921-2008), Indonesia's second president, came to power amid a period of exceptional crisis and bloodshed. His predecessor, Soekarno, had created a highly dangerous antagonistic government composition consisting of nationalists, communists and religious fractions. Another side eager to retain political power, the army, managed to become more influential in politics during the 1950s when it had to break down a number of revolts that threatened to disintegrate Indonesia. Together these four sides were highly distrustful towards each other, culminating in the tragedies of the mid 1960s when a group of leftist officers, allegedly influenced by the communist PKI party, committed a pre-emptive coup against seven top army officers who, allegedly, wanted to topple president Soekarno. Suharto, a high officer who took control over the army during these chaotic days, blamed the coup on the PKI and during the subsequent months hundreds of thousands of communists were slaughtered on Sumatra, Java and Bali. Although much of the facts will remain unknown, it became clear that General Suharto emerged as the strong power out of the chaos in the mid-1960s.


The Transfer of Power; the Old Order Becomes the New Order

On 11 March 1966 Indonesia was still in a state of total shock and chaos. On that particular day president Soekarno was pressured into signing a decree in which army officer Suharto received full power to guarantee security, calm and stability in the country. This decree became known as the Supersemar document and meant the effective transfer of executive power from Soekarno to Suharto. Suharto then quickly banned the communist PKI party, started cleansing the army from leftist elements and began to expand the political role of the army in Indonesian society. Although still president, Soekarno's powers were reduced more and more until Suharto was formally named acting president in 1967 and inducted as Indonesia's second president in 1968. This marked the emergence of a new era which was called the 'New Order'. Policies quickly changed a rather rigorous course from the start of this New Order. Emphasis of the new government was put on economic development. Ties with the West, broken by Soekarno, were restored which enabled the flow of much needed foreign aid to reach Indonesia. Prudent fiscal management was introduced by the economic technocrats and the hostile and costly confrontation politics towards Malaysia were stopped. 
Suharto's next step was the depoliticization of Indonesia. Cabinet ministers were not allowed to make their own policies but instead had to implement the policies that were formulated higher up. Golkar (acronym for Golongan Karya, or functional groups) was used as Suharto's powerful parliamentary vehicle. It contained several hundreds of smaller functional groups (such as labour unions, peasants and businesses) which made sure that the Indonesian people were no longer to be mobilized by political parties. Golkar was developed into an electoral machinery to produce a majority for the government. It had a network up to the village districts and was financially sponsored to promote the central government. Civil servants were obliged to support Golkar while village heads received quotas of Golkar votes to fill. These policies resulted in a big victory for Golkar during the 1971 elections. To extend his grip on politics even further, Suharto 'encouraged' the nine political parties that existed to merge into two. Firstly, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, abbreviated PPP) consisting of the Muslim parties and, secondly, the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, abbreviated PDI) consisting of the nationalist and Christian parties. Political activities, however, were very much restricted to short campaign periods prior to national elections.


Intensifying Authoritarianism


From the early beginnings of the New Order, macroeconomic figures were impressive (a detailed account can be found in the New Order Miracle section). However, these economic policies also led to resentment by the Indonesian people as the government was considered to be too focused on attracting foreign investors. When big investment opportunities were given to Indonesians it were usually military officers or the small group of ethnic Chinese Indonesians who, although forming a small portion of the total population, were dominating the economy. Fed up with corruption, collusion and nepotism, thousands of people went to demonstrate in 1974 when the Japanese prime minister paid a visit to Jakarta. This demonstration turned into massive violent riots which became known as the 'Malari-riots'. It was a frightening experience for the government because it proved unable to control the people. Concerned that one day there might be an uprising among the millions of urban and rural poor, new (more repressive) policies were implemented by the government. Twelve newspapers were closed and journalists detained without trial, thus stimulating self-censorship. Any dissent expressed by the public (such as demonstrations) were now quickly act upon. The economic side of this policy shift - much to the approval of the Indonesians - was the introduction of more restrictive measures on foreign investment and preferential policies favouring indigenous businessmen. 
In national politics Suharto managed to tighten his position in the 1970s. The oil booms made sure that money was abundant, which was used for financing progress with the development of the country's infrastructure and poverty alleviation programs. Internationally, however, Indonesia's standing was weakened by its invasion of East Timor. After decolonization from Portugal - and East Timor's subsequent declaration of independence in 1975 - the Indonesian army quickly invaded the country; an invasion marked by violence.
In 1984 all social-political organizations were decreed to declare the Pancasila (the five principles that form the foundation of the Indonesian state, introduced by Soekarno in the 1940s) as their sole ideology. Suharto could now use the Pancasila as a tool for repression because all organizations were under continuous threat of being accused of anti-Pancasila activities.
It can be stated that during the 1980s Suharto was on the pinnacle of his power. Each election implied an easy victory. Moreover, he had succeeded in making the army powerless. Similar to the political parties and civil service, the army was there only to implement Suharto's policy. But this depoliticization of Indonesian society had one important side effect. It caused the revival of an Islamic consciousness, especially among the youth. As the political arena was closed territory, the Muslims saw Islam as a safe alternative. Complaints regarding the government were discussed in mosques and filled the sermons as it was too risky to speak out at demonstrations (which were curbed anyway). This Muslim revival would cause another policy shift in the early 1990s.


Shifting Focus to Islam

As Islamic forces have always been strong throughout Indonesia's history, Muslim leaders of organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) have had more room than others to criticize Suharto. When Islam became a political alternative to express resentment, Suharto (himself a nominal Muslim) began to take a new approach towards the Islam in the early 1990s. This included his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991, more 'Islam-friendly' officers in the top ranks of the army and the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. ICMI was set up as a sounding board for Muslim input into public policy rather than being a mass-based political vehicle. Among its membership were critical non-government Muslim leaders and cabinet members. All these measures combined did somewhat dilute criticism from the Muslim community.


Rising Opposition

During the course of the 1990s Suharto's New Order government began to run out of sync with an increasing assertive Indonesian society. This was partly due to its own success: impressive economic development had resulted in more Indonesians being educated and this group was frustrated at not having any influence on the political course of the country, while indigenous businessmen were frustrated at being empty-handed when large investment opportunities went to family members or close friends of Suharto. Starting from 1993 street demonstrations and protests started to become more frequent and not without success: a state-sponsored lottery was forced to withdraw after demonstrations by students and certain Muslim groups. Moreover, some government-backed officials were defeated during provincial elections. This showed the public that Suharto's regime was not invincible.
Another issue that had a negative impact on the position of the government was its meddling with the internal party politics of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Megawati Soekarnoputri (daughter of Soekarno) was elected as the chairperson of the PDI in 1993 to replace Suryadi. The government, however, did not recognize this decision and ordered a new election. Again, Megawati was elected and this time it was ratified at the PDI congress. Megawati, increasingly critical of Suharto's regime, was seen as a real threat by the government due to the status of her father. The government therefore backed Suryadi in yet another congress in which Megawati was not invited to participate. It then resulted in Suryadi's re-election as chairman but Megawati, obviously, refused to acknowledge the result of this congress. It subsequently led to a schism in the PDI as well as violent clashes at its headquarters in Jakarta. Society at large was frustrated that Suharto meddled with the internal affairs of the PDI, especially because it involved a daughter of Soekarno.


The Collapse of Suharto's New Order

The legitimacy of Suharto's authoritarian rule lay primarily in the economic development that took place during its reign. From despair in the mid-1960s, rapid industrialization had turned Indonesia into a promising country. Influential international institutions (such as the World Bank) labelled Indonesia as an 'East Asian Miracle' in the early 1990s. Other phrases that were used by international institutions to describe Indonesia's economic performance were 'Asian Tiger' and 'High Performing Asian Economy' (HPAE). Of course, the international community was also aware about the fact that human rights were not always respected by the authorities in the country. But, ironically, its suppressive nature was also key in alleviating millions of people out of poverty because there was little room for dissent in policy-making and policy implementation. In the mid-1960s more than 50 percent of the population was classified as poor, while in 1993 this number had been reduced to 13.5 percent of the population. Other social indicators (such as school enrollment, infant mortality, life expectancy) showed similar positive results.
Suharto's style of rule was that of a political patronage system. In exchange for electoral (or financial) support, he would often buy off critics by providing them with good government positions or investment opportunities. But this preferential treatment was not confined to his critics only. During the last decade of Suharto's rule his children and close friends were able to set up huge business empires purely because of their closeness to Suharto. Although many Indonesians were frustrated at this high level of corruption, nepotism and collusion in government circles, the government could always point to its impressive economic progress while at the same time paying lip service to the people by claiming to take efforts to reduce corruption in the country. But this economic pillar of legitimacy vanished when the Asian Financial Crisis erupted in 1997-1998 (for a detailed account visit the Asian Financial Crisis section). Indonesia was the country that would be hit hardest by this crisis, snowballing from an economic crisis to a social as well as a political one. Much of its economic and social achievements were undone and the Indonesian people became determined to keep pushing for a new (Suharto-less) government. Jakarta was turned into a battlefield in which violent riots destroyed thousands of buildings, while more than one thousand people were killed. Suharto was soon politically isolated and had no other option than to resign from the presidency. On 21 May 1998 vice president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, a close ally of Suharto, became Indonesia's third president. He had no other option than to comply with the Indonesian people's wishes and to usher in the era of Reformation.



Reformation; New Challenges and Changes for Indonesia

When president Suharto left office in May 1998 it marked the beginning of a new period in Indonesian history. After being under the rule of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime for more than three decades, Indonesia embarked for a new phase called Reformation (Reformasi in Indonesian). It was envisaged to be the starting period of a democracy with open and liberal politics in which extensive autonomy would be transferred to the regions, away from the center (decentralization). The basis of this transition was formulated in a law which passed parliament in 1999 and called for the transfer of administrative powers from the central government to the regional districts. The role of the central government was to be confined to matters connected to defence, foreign policy, fiscal-monetary and macroeconomic policy, justice and religion. Not less important was that the regions would receive a larger share of revenues from the regional production of natural resources. However, as not every region is blessed with abundant natural resources, it increased the gap between richer and poorer regions. Along with power, corruption was also decentralized to the regional level where so-called shadow states emerged in which the regional elite is in control of power, business and money flows. One of the victims is the environment. In exchange for large sums of money, logging permits were granted on a large scale.
The process of decentralization was also accompanied by regional violence entrenched with ethnic or religious aspects because of the emergence of competition for local political positions in conjunction with a revival of regional identities. For more information on this topic, please visit the Ethnic and Religious Violence section.


The Bacharuddin Habibie Administration (1998-1999)

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, vice president during Suharto's last presidential term, replaced Suharto in 1998 when the latter stepped down from the presidency. But this did not mean an end to the political system that had been applied during the New Order. Many Indonesians were highly suspicious of Habibie because of his closeness to Suharto (who had been a father figure to Habibie) and the fact that he had been an important player in Suharto's political patronage system. Habibie's refusal to order a thorough investigation into Suharto's accumulated wealth only strengthened this distrust.
Habibie had no other option than to launch the reform program. It would have been political suicide if he did not comply with demands of the Indonesian public. During Habibie's presidency thirty new laws were approved by the parliament (MPR), some of which characterized by fundamental breaks with the political past. A number of noteworthy reforms were:
Introduction of freedom of the press
Allowing the establishment of new political parties and unions
Release of political prisoners
Limiting the presidency to two terms of five years
Decentralization of power to the regions

Another important decision was to schedule new general elections, to be held in June 1999. Parliament had no intention yet, however, to reduce political influence of the army and to order an investigation into Suharto's wealth.
Indonesia entered a period of increasing violence in the regions. East Java was plagued by mysterious killings (perhaps led by army units) while religious violence flared up in Jakarta, Ambon (Moluccas), Kupang (West Timor) and West Kalimantan. Moreover, three regions rebelled against the central authorities: Aceh (Sumatra), Irian Jaya (Papua) and East Timor. It caused an environment in which foreign investors were hesitant to invest, thus holding back economic recovery for the country. Not less important was the sanitation of the Indonesian financial sector, which had been the heart of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), set up in January 1998, became a powerful agency that undertook an integrated and comprehensive series of activities consisting of matters such as bank liability programs, the recovery of state funds, bank restructuring, bank loan restructuring, and shareholders settlements.
The East Timor case was one that caused much conflict, both nationally and internationally. East Timor had declared independence in 1975 but was invaded by Indonesia the following year. This did not end its desire for independence. Habibie had an open-minded stance towards East Timor's independence. He stated that if East Timor rejects the special status of autonomous province within Indonesia, it can become independent. This statement of Habibie was not agreed upon by the Indonesian army that fiercely wanted to prevent separation from Indonesia. According to the army East Timor's separation was dangerous for Indonesian unity as it could lead to a domino effect in the other provinces. It was decided that the people of East Timor could express themselves on this matter through a referendum. The outcome of this referendum was that 78 percent of the voters chose for independence. The Indonesian army subsequently reacted by ravaging much of East Timor, killing more than one thousand people.
Habibie's reputation was severely damaged by losing control over the situation in East Timor. Although it were army units and civilian militias that committed the extreme violence, Habibie was personally held responsible being acting president. Moreover, Habibie himself became linked to a big corruption scandal involving Bank Bali. This bank received funds from the IBRA for its recapitalization but -allegedly- almost half of these funds were used for Habibie's campaign team.


Elections of 1999

After 1955 the Indonesian people were forced to wait for 44 years to witness another example of free and fair parliamentary elections. In this election people voted for a political party, not for an individual. Since there were no limitations on the establishment of political parties as part of the reform program, Indonesia had witnessed the mushrooming of many such parties. No less than 48 parties were allowed to participate in the elections of 1999, although most of these parties would play an insignificant role. In modern Indonesian politics a political party can be regarded as a political vehicle for its leader instead of an institution that expresses a shared ideology or vision; and only a few people could count on public support during the 1999 elections.
One of these people was Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president Soekarno. She had established a new party PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) in 1998 after being outcasted from the PDI in 1996. Due to her father's legacy and her opposition to the New Order towards the end of Suharto's rule, she enjoyed widespread popularity (especially on the islands of Java and Bali). Similar to her father, she stressed national unity and propagated secular nationalism. Another popular national figure was Abdurrahman Wahid who had founded the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) in 1998. Previously, he worked as chairman of the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), but now set his eyes on the presidency. Wahid propagated a sort of tolerant nationalism and could rely on popular support from the traditional Muslim community (mostly on Java). Habibie, acting president, fostered ambitions to maintain his position. Although not enjoying much popularity, he could rightfully claim that he launched the reform program and could benefit from Golkar's powerful political machine which stretched up to the village level. Lastly, Amien Rais, exponent of opposition against Suharto's New Order, joined the race with his PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional).     
An important matter during these elections was that seats in parliament would be divided in half. The island of Java received half of the seats while the other half would go to all other islands. This was done as a measure to lessen Java's dominant position in politics. But as Java is much more densely populated than Outer Java, it basically implied that a non-Javanese vote was more powerful than a Javanese one. This situation would have far reaching consequences for the results in this election.
Parliamentary Election 1999

     1999
 PDI-P
      34%
 Golkar
      22%
 PKB
      13%
 PPP
      11%
 PAN
       7%
Around 90 percent of the Indonesian electorate came to cast their vote on 7 June 1999. As could be expected, the PDI-P received most of the votes (34 percent) with Golkar coming in second (22 percent). However, these two parties were allocated almost a similar amount of seats in the parliament as the PDI-P received most of the votes from Java, while Golkar enjoyed most votes from the Outer Islands.  
In October Habibie had to deliver an accountability speech in front of the parliament. This speech was a report regarding his performance as president and the performance of policies during his presidency. His speech was rejected by a majority of the members of parliament. After this rejection Habibie decided to renounce his bid for the presidency in 1999. This meant that there were now just two persons who enjoyed significant political support to become the next president of Indonesia: Megawati and Wahid. In another session the Indonesian parliament eventually chose Wahid as the new president. Megawati became the new vice president and Rais was elected as chairman of the parliament.


The Abdurrahman Wahid Presidency (1999-2001)

In order to establish a broad based coalition Wahid appointed members from many political parties as well as army officers as ministers to his cabinet. But this diverse composition also implied a lack of cohesion within the cabinet and, moreover, it contained few reformers. Wahid did put effort in reducing the political role of the army but this led to conflict and the subsequent loss of support from the army. Without army support there were few means to survive for the president as Indonesia was plagued by conflicts and violence in the regions. These regional outbursts needed army intervention but due to the conflict with Wahid the army did not seem to have any interest in settling or interfering, resulting in the undermining of Wahid's presidency.      
Corruption cases still seemed to be the rule rather than the exception. In his first year as president, Wahid sacked seven ministers who were all involved in alleged corruption cases. Four of these ministers belonged to the four most important coalition partners: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP and PAN. This meant that Wahid became even more isolated. And - even more serious - Wahid himself also became linked to two corruption scandals which eventually led to his impeachment. These two scandals were called 'Buloggate' and 'Bruneigate', each involving the abstraction of public funds. Indonesian parliament saw this as a great opportunity to impeach Wahid and Megawati was subsequently appointed as the new president, while Hamzah Haz (leader of the PPP) became the new vice president.


The Megawati Soekarnoputri Presidency (2001-2004)

Towards the end of Suharto's New Order rule, the late Soekarno (Indonesia's first president) became a symbol of opposition to the government. Soekarno was the national hero who had devoted his life to - and succeeded in - reaching independence. Most of the anti-Suharto protesters were born during the New Order regime which lasted for more than three decades and therefore probably had rudimentary knowledge only of the pre-Suharto era. But for them Soekarno represented freedom, an independence from Suharto. Therefore it was only logical that his daughter, Megawati, could count on much support among the people. But this support was based on her status as daughter of Soekarno only and not based on her political vision nor skills. Her cabinet did not differ markedly from Wahid's initial cabinet: it contained a broad parliamentary basis and army officers were well represented. Megawati herself did not do a lot of decision making, which she left to her ministers. There were no signs that corruption was dealt with while the status quo in the government remained. 
But although Megawati herself did not seem highly supportive of political reforms, the reform process had in fact already been initiated in 1999 when parliament commenced designing new laws (including constitutional amendments) which would become effective during Megawati's presidency. These reform measures implied a significant increase in democratic checks and balances which put an end to the possibility of an authoritarian regime. It placed power in the hands of the people instead of the government. Moreover, the executive and legislative branches were separated more strictly.  
Megawati's predecessor made strong efforts to reduce the influence of the army (which actually undermined his position) but Megawati herself had no intention to mingle with army affairs. As a consequence the army would regain some influence in politics. International developments also enlarged the role of the Indonesian army. After the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the American government resumed cooperation with the Indonesian army (which had been halted since the army's participation in violence in East Timor in 1999) to combat international terrorism. Although parliament had been careful in reducing the political role of the army, it was the commander-in-chief of the army himself who stated that by 2004 army fractions in the parliament should be eliminated; a military officer who wanted to become active in politics would have to resign from his military position first. These reforms were realized but did not mean an end to political influence of the army in Indonesian society. To this day the army is a strong force as former generals who are active in politics can still rely on a network within the army and, moreover, the army is still entangled in business activities in the regions.


Elections of 2004

Parliamentary election

In April 2004 approximately 84 percent of the Indonesian electorate (constituting around 113,5 million people) casted their vote for national parliament. Contrary to the election in 1999, this time Indonesians could vote for specific candidates of a party which brought forward a more personal element in the election. In this election the two biggest parties of the previous election, to wit Golkar and PDI-P, lost their absolute majority. The PDI-P tumbled, as could be expected, from 34 percent to 19 percent as the Indonesian people were not satisfied with Megawati's presidential performance that seemed to lack vision and leadership while corruption within her party was growing. Golkar, that had proved to be able to survive without the support of Suharto and the army, maintained their share of the votes (22 percent), although they had expected to do better. 
But two newcomers, both not having participated in the 1999 elections, drew attention. The first one being the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, abbreviated PKS), a party which places great emphasis on the role of Islam in public life. It received seven percent of the votes in the 2004 election. The second one being the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, abbreviated PD). This party was the political vehicle of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (often referred to as SBY), the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in Megawati's cabinet. Yudhoyono had hoped to become vice president in 2001 but lost out to Hamzah Haz. Having high political aspirations of his own and the support of a small group of intellectuals around him (who set up the PD especially for him), Yudhoyono seemed to be a potential prospective president candidate for the 2004 elections. This bothered president Megawati and caused a riff between the two. In early 2004 Yudhoyono left the Megawati cabinet, a decision which gave him great public sympathy. The PD received just over seven percent of the votes, enabling Yudhoyono to participate in the upcoming presidential elections of 2004 (a party needed a minimum of five percent to be authorized to nominate a candidate for the presidency).
Parliamentary Election 2004

    2004
    1999
 PDI-P
     19%
     34%
 Golkar
     22%
     22%
 PKB
     11%
     13%
 PPP
      8%
     11%
 PD
      7%
       -
 PKS
      7%
       -

Presidential election

In July 2004 the Indonesian people went to the ballot boxes for the presidential elections. The winner of this election would require an absolute majority, therefore it seemed likely that a second round would be needed in which the top two of the first round compete each other. Due to the fact that the president and vice president participate in this election as an inseparable couple, its composition is of strategic importance. Yudhoyono (PD), leading in the speculative polls, teamed up with Jusuf Kalla (a businessman from Eastern Indonesia). Megawati (PDI-P) paired with Hasyim Muzadi (chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama). Another pair that seemed to have a chance, although slight, was Wiranto (a former army general, nominated by Golkar) who was joined by Sallahudin Wahid (vice chairman of the National Human Rights Commission).
With 33.5 percent of the votes, less than expected, Yudhoyono and Kalla became the winners of the first round. On second place, thus entitled to contest in the second round, was the Megawati-Muzadi pair who received 26.5 percent of the votes. As expected, the second round was easily won by Yudhoyono with 60.5 percent and he was consequently inaugurated as Indonesia's new president on 20 October 2004.
Presidential Election 2004

     2004
 (1st round)
      2004
 (2nd round)
 Yudhoyono,
 Kalla
    33.5%
    60.5%
 Megawati,
 Muzadi
    26.5%
    39.5%
 Wiranto,
 Wahid
    22.0%
        -
 Rais,
 Yudho Husodo
    14.5%
        -
 Haz,
 Gumelar
      3.0%
        -


The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government I (2004-2009)

The Democratic Party (PD) was primarily established to function as Yudhoyono's political vehicle on his path towards the Indonesian presidency. It propagated democracy, pluralism and the professionalization of the army (Yudhoyono himself being a retired army general). But politics was not something new to Yudhoyono who was appointed chief of staff for social-political affairs (an army department) in 1997. At this position he showed his reformist nature when he presented the 'New Paradigm' which called for an end to direct military involvement in politics (through a gradual withdrawal from the national and regional parliaments) and called for a split between the army and police (this split was decided upon during Habibie's presidency and became effective during the Wahid administration). Later, Yudhoyono became minister of Mines and Energy during the Wahid presidency and coordinating minister for Legal, Political, and Security Affairs during Megawati's presidency. In both cases a fallout with the president led to his early departure. But he enjoyed popularity among the Indonesians due to his reformist ideas, his successful mediating in a number of regional violent conflicts, and his clean record of corruption (fighting corruption was in fact an important element in his campaigns prior to the elections). 
From the start expectations were very high. Yudhoyono, being regarded as a strong and balanced character, took office with ambitious reformist ideals such as the toppling of corruption and terrorism, the strengthening of democracy and human rights, and the fostering of accelerated economic growth. Surely his ambitions were - realistically speaking - too high as Indonesia is a difficult country to reform within a timespan of a few years. A slow and inefficient bureaucracy, opposing forces throughout society and widespread corruption (especially on the regional level) make it difficult to implement policies effectively. As promised during his campaign period, around half of Yudhoyono's cabinet ministers consisted of non-partisan professionals, especially on positions concerning the economy, in order to encourage professionalization.
Yudhoyono's presidency is also characterized by disasters causing some people to label him the 'disaster president'. Most famous natural disaster is the horrific tsunami in Aceh which killed more than 200,000 people in Aceh in 2004. Other disasters were the earthquake in Bantul (Central Java) in 2006 killing 6,000 people, the Sidoarjo mud flow ruining hundreds of hectares in East Java as well as causing the evacuation of thousands of people, multiple floods in Jakarta triggering the evacuation of about half a million people in 2007 and, lastly, the Merapi volcano eruptions in 2010 which killed 353 people and caused the evacuating of 350,000 people.  
A good achievement of the Yudhoyono administration is the fostering of strong macroeconomic fundamentals: foreign debt has declined impressively, foreign exchange reserves have improved and annual GDP growth has been satisfying. These strong fundamentals are what made Indonesia successfully sail through the global crisis of 2008-2009.


Elections of 2009 

Parliamentary election

The parliamentary elections for the DPR (People’s Representative Council) and DPD (Regional Representative Council), held on 9 April 2009, proved a clear victory for Yudhoyono's PD party (20.8 percent), while Golkar came in second (14.4 percent) and the PDI-P third (14.0 percent). Factors that contributed to this victory of the PD were massive cash programs to support the poor and declining food and fuel prices which contributed to the notion that the national economy was performing well. The public also considered Yudhoyono to be sincere in toppling corruption; the PD was known as the least corrupted political party. 
A party (or a coalition of parties) winning more than 112 seats (twenty percent) in the 560-member DPR or winning at least 25 percent of the national vote was allowed to nominate a candidate for the presidency. This put Yudhoyono in a strong position for the upcoming presidential election. But controversy arose on the new parliamentary threshold which stipulated that only parties receiving more than 2.5 percent of the popular vote would be seated in the DPR. This was a big disadvantage for the smaller parties.
An interesting outcome in this election was an increasing preference for secular-nationalist parties over Islamic or Islamist parties. The total of Islamic parties combined received 27.8 percent of the votes only, indicating a continuing declining trend compared to previous elections (38.1 percent in 2004).
Parliamentary Election 2009

   2009
   2004
   1999
 PD
   20.8%
    7.5%
       -
 Golkar
   14.5%
   21.6%
   22.4%
 PDI-P
   14.0%
   18.5%
   33.7%
 PKS
    7.9%
    7.3%
    1.4%
 PAN
    6.0%
    6.4%
    7.1%

Presidential election

There were three pairs that ran for presidency and vice presidency in the presidential election of 2009. First of all acting president Yudhoyono whose PD party had won the parliamentary election and who was entitled for one more term as president. He chose Boediono as his running mate for the vice presidency. Boediono, an economist, was not affiliated to any political party and had been Governor of Bank Indonesia (the central bank) and coordinating minister for Economic Affairs during Yudhoyono's first cabinet. The second pair that run for office consisted of Golkar's Jusuf Kalla (Yudhoyono's former vice president) who partnered with former army general Wiranto (who had been accused of human rights abuses in East Timor). And lastly, Megawati joined the race again. This time she chose Prabowo as her running mate. Prabowo, also a former army general was son-in-law to Suharto and is believed to have been responsible for violence against anti-Suharto intellectuals and students, as well as against the ethnic Chinese community in Jakarta, during the riots in 1998. 
Without having to need a second round this time, Yudhoyono and Boediono won the presidential election with an absolute majority (60.8 percent). The international community regarded this as an important element for maintaining political stability in Indonesia. The Megawati-Prabowo pair received 26.8 percent of the votes, while Kalla-Wiranto came in third with 12.1 percent.
Presidential Election 2009

    2009
 Yudhoyono,
 Boediono
   60.8%
 Megawati,
 Prabowo
   26.8%
 Kalla,
 Wiranto
   12.1%

The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government II (2009-2014)

On 22 October 2009 the inauguration of the Second United Indonesia Cabinet took place. This cabinet was a coalition between the PD, Golkar and the four Islamic parties PKS, PAN, PKB and PPP. Besides appointing ministers from all these six parties, Yudhoyono also placed quite some professionals (non-partisan figures) on key ministry posts such as the ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade, National Education and Health. Only two former army generals were appointed.  
But despite strong macroeconomic indicators, popular support for Yudhoyono has begun to erode. Yudhoyono did not meet expectations in toppling corruption, an important campaign slogan of his party. High corruption cases involving government staff made frequent headlines. More severely, the PD itself became deeply involved in corruption scandals when several of its members, including party treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin, were accused and trialled for the 2011 Southeast Asian Games graft case in which - allegedly - bribes were paid connected to the construction of the athletes’ village. These scandals severely harmed both Yudhoyono's and his party's popularity.
According to many Indonesians the emergence of graft cases within the PD is a sign of Yudhoyono's weak leadership. On other subjects Yudhoyono is regarded to act weak as well. Many reform-minded Indonesians were disappointed when he did not back reformist Finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati when she - together with vice president Boediono - were criticized for mishandling a bank bailout case in 2008. Sri Mulyani moved to the World Bank Group where she started working as a managing director. Most people assume, however, that her early departure was connected to pressures from certain political forces with major business interests as her reform policies had led to conflicts with these interests. Another supposed weakness in Yudhoyono's leadership concerns his slow and unconvincing condemnation of violent attacks on minority religions, such as the Ahmadiyya killings in February 2011 when an Islamist mob killed members of the small local Ahmadiyya Islamic sect in the province of Banten.
The future of the PD remains uncertain. Popular support is declining fast and as Yudhoyono is not allowed to participate in the 2014 elections, a new candidate(s) for the party's leadership is needed but is yet to be found.



History


For more than three centuries most of the area now comprising Indonesia was ruled by the Netherlands under a system designed to serve the economic needs of the metropolitan power. Unlike the British in India or the United States in the Philippines, the Dutch saw no need to bring significant numbers of Indonesians into government or to start preparing them to manage their own affairs. The 1930 census, the last before Indonesia's independence, showed there were 208,269 Dutch living in Indonesia. They ran virtually everything, including serving as postmen in the capital city of Batavia. M.C. Ricklefs in his study A History of Modern Indonesia quotes Dutch governor-general B.C. de Jonge (1931-36) as saying, "we have ruled here for 300 years with the whip and the club, and we shall still be doing it for another 300 years." Education for the local people was also not high on the Dutch agenda, with the result that there were only a few hundred Indonesian college graduates out of a total population estimated at 70 million at the time of independence. A large number of those graduates were in politically acceptable fields such as medicine and engineering. Economists, political scientists, and administrative specialists were in very short supply.

From Independence to the Soeharto Era

The result was that Indonesians were poorly equipped to manage their own affairs, much less to run a sophisticated democratic form of government when they achieved independence. The institutions to support a democratic system were lacking, and the Indonesians themselves had inherited from their Dutch and Japanese rulers the traditions and legal structure of a highly authoritarian system. Moreover, the bulk of the population was poor, illiterate, and used to paternalistic rule, while those who were politically informed constituted a very thin layer of urban society. Nonetheless the newly independent nation's rulers did better than expected, and the commitment to the concept of democracy by the elite resulted in the period 1950-57 being the freest and most open in Indonesia's history. It was followed by two periods of authoritarianism: Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" (1957-65) and Soeharto's "New Order" (1966-98).

Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945. The following day the revolutionary leaders promulgated what is now known as the 1945 constitution. Modeled on the Chinese Organic Law of 1931, it is short (37 articles), vague, and provides for a powerful president and a very weak legislature. It departs in important ways from Western democratic concepts. With the achievement of independence in December 1949, Indonesia's leaders promulgated a new basic document--the 1950 constitution—that mandated a parliamentary system with a largely ceremonial president, guaranteed human rights, placed the military under civilian control, and provided checks and balances on the misuse of power. Drafted by the Indonesians themselves, this constitution survived until 1959 when Sukarno unilaterally abrogated it, reimposed the 1945 constitution, and formally proclaimed Guided Democracy.

The period from December 1949 until July 1955 was tumultuous with monumental administrative problems, outbreaks of dissent and violence in several parts of the archipelago, and the coming and going of five cabinets. With the opposition becoming increasingly vocal over the delay in holding national elections, it was decided that polling for an elected parliament would take place in September 1955 with elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution that December. The ensuring election campaign further aggravated regional and intergroup frictions, and this is worth bearing in mind in case history should repeat itself.

Interest in the elections was high, and 91.5 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots. A total of 28 parties gained seats, but only 4 really counted. Those 4 shared roughly equally in about 75 percent of the vote. (see Table 1) Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians) was created by the Japanese in 1943 as a vehicle to control Islam, and it included most Muslim educational and social organizations. It was banned by Sukarno in 1960. Several present-day parties try to trace their lineage to Masyumi. Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Religious Teachers, NU) was established in 1926 by the grandfather of the present NU leader, and the organization continues today as the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia (estimated 30 million members). It is headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, and is the patron of the present National Awakening Party (PKB). It is a conservative rural organization with particular strength in East Java. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) became the political vehicle of Sukarno. In 1973 it was fused by Soeharto into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, a merger of the Sukarno-era PNI with several Christian and other parties) and can now said to be the political vehicle of Sukarno's daughter Megawati, leader of the present Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P). The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), at one time the third-largest communist party in the world, was eliminated following the abortive 1965 coup.

The parliamentary elections produced no solutions and only served to draw the battle lines among various groups more sharply. The December elections for a Constituent Assembly produced similar results. The assembly convened in November 1956 and was dissolved by Sukarno three years later without having drafted a constitution. Indonesians tend to view the period 1950-57 as one of fast-changing, weak governments, divisive party politics, and administrative chaos, as power shifted among the leading parties. Some outside observers are now saying that things were not as bad as they seemed and that both Sukarno and Soeharto, for their own purposes, denigrated the period of constitutional democracy. There is undoubtedly some truth in this, but at the same time there is little doubt that the period saw a sharpening of regional and intergroup tensions and many basic economic and social problems were not addressed. Also relevant is the fact that that there were four prime ministers during 1945-49 with governments changing on the average every 10.6 months; 1950-57 was a little better with six prime ministers and an average term of 12.4 months. Although the early 1950s were a time of political openness, there is no gainsaying the fact that political instability during that time paved the way for the succeeding authoritarian governments.

In March 1957, with serious disruptions in Sumatra and elsewhere, Sukarno proclaimed martial law. This was followed on July 6, 1959, by the institution of Guided Democracy, abolition of the Constituent Assembly, and restoration of the 1945 constitution by executive decree. In March the following year the elected parliament was dissolved when it failed to pass the government's budget. Thereafter Sukarno enacted budgets by decree as the economy descended into total chaos. Indonesia's experiment with constitutional democracy had ended.

The New Order

Soeharto came to power in the wake of the 1965 coup attempt in which the top leadership of the Indonesian army was murdered. As the ranking army officer left alive, he gradually restored order, consolidated his position, and moved Sukarno off center stage. In March 1966 he was given authority to exercise the powers of the presidency and the following year he was elected acting president by the MPR. His rule was to last for 32 years, and he became increasingly oppressive with the passage of time.

At the outset of his administration, Soeharto set two priorities: achieving stability and promoting economic development. He brought into office a talented group of U.S.-trained economists and received political advice from various sources, including a Chinese-dominated think tank. Excellent progress was made in straightening out the economic mess inherited from Sukarno (inflation at 600 percent, per capita GDP of $70, and an unpayable foreign debt). Initially his administration was fairly open -- certainly more so than that of Sukarno. But within a few years he became concerned that political party maneuvering, press criticism, and friction among various societal groups would interfere with the pace of economic growth.

Increasingly he cracked down on dissent and circled the wagons around an ever smaller group of family members and cronies, and his New Order government stifled expression and demanded uniformity in a society that is far from uniform. Ten parties had contested the 1971 parliamentary elections, the first held under Soeharto's New Order. This included nine opposition parties left over from the Sukarno days and a new government party called Golkar (the governing party; see discussion below under The Party System). In 1973 Soeharto forced the nine opposition parties to merge into two groups. Four Islamic-based parties were fused into the United Development Party (PPP), and five secular parties were forced into PDI. Golkar remained the government party, and it produced majorities for Soeharto over the next 25 years ranging from 60 to nearly 75 percent. But in actual fact, political parties were largely irrelevant. Even Golkar was kept on a tight leash, and the other two were only symbolic with few real differences in party platforms.

Soeharto's suppression of expression and dissent was accepted during most of the New Order in the face of impressive economic growth and improvements in living standards. But by the 1990s people were becoming disillusioned with Soeharto and tired of the state's growing oppression. Such a role by the government may have been accepted by a largely rural, poorly educated population, but after 30 years of economic growth Indonesian society was more urban, better educated, and more sophisticated. According to the 1990 census, over 50 million people lived in urban areas. The growth of an educated professional class led to demands for more "openness," and this became the buzzword in political discussion.

Indonesians became increasingly outspoken against concentration of power at the top and about the business activities of the Soeharto children, who, in the view of many, acted like members of an imperial family. And Soeharto himself gave evidence that he had changed--he no longer had his deft touch in dealing with real or imagined rivals. His brutal removal of Megawati as head of PDI in 1996 and granting one of his sons a monopoly in producing Indonesia's "national car" (a car that was actually made in South Korea) turned off many more of those who had stuck with him up to that point because he produced results on the economic front. The 1997 financial crisis, which hit Indonesia harder than any other Asian country, sealed his fate, and he was forced by student agitation, popular pressure, and defections among his senior cabinet members to resign on May 21, 1998.

The Habibie Administration

Soeharto's choice of vice president in 1998 as he stood for his seventh five-year term was B.J. Habibie, a German-trained aeronautical engineer who had served in the cabinet since 1978 as minister for research and technology. A protégé and longtime close associate of Soeharto, he was considered a poor choice by most of those Indonesians calling for more political openness. When Soeharto made his preference known in early 1998 the Indonesian rupiah, already under attack as a result of the financial crisis, reached its lowest point of 17,000 to the U.S. dollar. (In July 1997 it stood at 2,450 to the dollar.) One of the U.S.-educated economic technocrats, former cabinet member Emil Salim, announced that he would stand as a candidate against Habibie in the MPR elections. Salim knew his candidacy was doomed, but he apparently wanted to establish the precedent that the selection was not necessarily limited to Soeharto's choice. The assembly ignored Salim and voted unanimously for Soeharto and Habibie to serve from March 1998 until 2003. When Soeharto was forced to resign in May 1998, only 72 days after election to his seventh term, Habibie was sworn in as president in accordance with the constitution to serve out the remainder of Soeharto's five-year term.

Though not well equipped for the job by training or experience, Habibie has performed considerably better than most would have expected under the very difficult circumstances prevailing in Indonesia. Very early in his administration he announced that he would not attempt to serve out the rest of Soeharto's term but would move up parliamentary elections from 2002 and presidential elections from 2003 to 1999. This significantly defused charges that his presidency was not legitimate. He ended Soeharto's three-party system and opened the field, with the result that nearly 150 parties were announced. This has been narrowed to 48 by the government. He has also opened the possibility of wide-ranging autonomy or independence for East Timor, freed many political detainees, lifted restrictions on the media, and introduced some economic reforms, which, though sorely needed, have angered some elements of the public.

The MPR was called into session from November 11 to 13, 1998. In a session marred by serious violence and the death of a number of students agitating for Habibie's removal, the assembly took a number of important steps:

Amended the MPR internal rules to, inter alia, permit elected representatives of new parties to sit in that body as well as in the parliament and separated the leadership of the two bodies (formerly it had been the same).
Limited the president and vice president to a maximum of two five-year terms.
Decreed that parliamentary elections should be held in May or June 1999, that all parties meeting the legal requirements would be able to compete, and that appointed militar representation in legislative bodies should gradually be reduced in accordance with a law to be enacted later.
Provided for the establishment of an independent General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) to oversee the elections.

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